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Abstract
For decades researchers have used mirrors to study self-recognition. However, attempts to identify neural processes
underlying this ability have used photographs instead. Here we used event related potentials (ERPs) to compare self-face
recognition in photographs versus mirrors and found distinct neural signatures. Measures of visual self-recognition are
therefore not independent of the medium employed.
Citation: Butler DL, Mattingley JB, Cunnington R, Suddendorf T (2012) Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, How Does My Brain Recognize My Image at All? PLoS ONE 7(2):
e31452. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031452
Editor: Manos Tsakiris, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom
Received June 8, 2011; Accepted January 9, 2012; Published February 16, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Butler et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: These authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: davidbut@psy.uq.edu.au
Introduction
Many people start their day with a look in the mirror. Yet
despite interest from eminent scientists [1,2,3,4,5] it remains
unclear how we recognize our own image (i.e. visual self-
recognition). In a classic experiment, Gallup [4] found that
chimpanzees were also capable of self-recognition, as they used
mirrors to direct their behaviour towards an otherwise unseen
novel mark placed upon their face. Subsequent studies have
repeatedly shown that the only other primates that share this
capacity are members of our closest living relatives, the great apes
[4,6,7,8,9,10,11]. But not all humans recognize their own image.
Children begin to develop self-recognition only between ages 18–
24 months [12,13]. In adults this ability can become diminished in
conditions such as mirrored self-misidentification [14], body
dysmorphic disorder [15], schizophrenia [16], and anorexia
[17]. Recently, cognitive neuroscientists have attempted to identify
the neural processes underlying this fundamental ability by
studying participant’s responses to images of their own faces (for
reviews see [18,19,20,21]). However, despite the widespread use of
mirrors by both developmental and comparative psychologists (for
reviews see [22,23]), these studies have all used photographs rather
than mirrors.
Can results involving photographs be generalised to mirrors
and other media? A small number of developmental and
neuropsychological findings suggest this may be problematic.
For instance, children typically recognize themselves in mirrors
before doing so in other media [24,25,26,27]. In one study [24]
using live, mirror reversed video images, children required an
additional year before their passing rates were equivalent to self-
recognition in mirrors. Up to 25% of Alzheimer’s patients cannot
recognize themselves in videos despite doing so in mirrors [28],
and at least three cases have been reported showing the opposite
pattern [14,29,30]. These apparent dissociations suggest that
generalisations about the brain processes underlying self-recog-
nition based solely upon studies using photographs may not be
warranted. Here, for the first time, we examined neural activity in
response to mirrors. We used Event Related Potentials (ERPs) to
compare neural responses when seeing self in a mirror versus a
photograph (see Figure 1).
Results and Discussion
Data are presented for three ERPs proposed to reflect three
important stages of face processing [31,32,33,34,35,36]. The
grand averages and peak amplitudes for these ERPs are illustrated
in Figure 2. An initial featural encoding stage occurs when the
facial features are first detected (reflected by a positive peak of
amplitude at around 100 ms; i.e. the P100). This is followed by a
stage at which the configural relationship between features is
analysed (reflected by a negative going peak at around 170 ms; i.e.
the N170). A subsequent matching stage occurs when this newly
constructed representation is compared to previously stored
structural representations (reflected by a positive peak in amplitude
at around 250 ms; i.e. P250).
Compared with mirror images, photographs of self produced a
larger P100 amplitude with a longer latency (all reported findings
use p.,.05 or Bonferroni adjustments; see Materials and Methods
for full results). Furthermore, only photographs of self resulted in
more P100 amplitude in the right compared to left hemisphere.
For the N170, photographs produced more amplitude with an
earlier latency. Finally, there were similar amplitudes and latencies
for the P250, though differences between reflections and
photographs emerged when considering cerebral hemisphere:
only when viewing photographs was there more amplitude in the
left compared to the right hemisphere. Together, these results
show that self-recognition in different media involves distinct
neural signatures in relation to the featural, configural, and
matching stages of face recognition. These findings are consistent
with developmental and neuropsychological research indicating
that self-recognition may occur in one medium but not another
[14,24,25,26,27,29,30].
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e31452Why does self-recognition in mirrors and photographs produce
different neural signatures? Kinesthetic cues are available in
mirrors but not in photographs, so this may potentially account for
such differences. We think this is unlikely. Following standard ERP
procedure, participants were asked to minimize movements as
these produce artifacts that are removed from the data during
Figure 1. Black and white illustration of stimuli used. (A) Self photograph. (B) Self mirror. (C) Self wearing mask.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031452.g001
Figure 2. ERP activity. (A) Grand average ERPs for the P100, N170, and P250 (LH=Left Hemisphere, Oz=Midline, RH=Right Hemisphere; see
Materials and Methods for details about which channels were selected) (self photograph=red, self mirror=blue, self wearing mask=green). (B) P100
peak amplitude. (C) N170 peak amplitude. (D) P250 peak amplitude. Differences emerged for all components when comparing self in mirrors vs
photographs. Differences between self when unmasked and masked emerged for all ERP components except the P100.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031452.g002
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studies indicate that it takes at least 200 milliseconds to move one’s
eyes (let alone head) from fixation to a target (e.g., [37]), and our
differences here are already being observed 100 milliseconds after
the presentation of faces. Note also that kinesthetic cues may not
be sufficient to pass mark tests [24,25,38]. For example, despite
being able to observe their leg movement in a mirror, few children
recognized their marked image when they were surreptitiously
placed in novel pants. Children that had 30 seconds exposure to
wearing these pants, on the other hand, passed the task [38].
Another potential factor is that photographs involve images of
the past, while mirrors involve concurrent images in the here and
now. Evidence supporting the possibility that temporal differences
play a role comes from developmental studies where, despite
recognizing one’s image in live videos by 36 months, children still
require an additional 12 months before showing equivalent
passing rates for videos involving three-minute delays [24,25,27].
Photographs and reflections may also produce different affective
responses. There is evidence for an affective processing route
contributing to the recognition of familiar faces [39], and patients
with dementia who can not recognize their own reflection may
nonetheless experience strong emotional responses when present-
ed with a mirror [40]. Finally, it is also possible that, given
everyday experience with our reflections, we may have developed
the expectation that when we look in a mirror we will see ourselves
and not others. Such an expectation is unlikely to be that strong
for photographs. We note that this explanation may also account
for children’s different performance between self-recognition in
mirrors and videos [24]. Furthermore, it is more broadly
consistent with the claim that expectations can alter brain
processes underlying face recognition. For example, the amplitude
of the N170 was found to change depending on whether
participants knew the ambiguous stimuli they were looking at
were faces or not [41]. Future research should examine what
exactly causes these different neural responses to reflections and
photographs of self.
The current study allowed us to address one more issue.
Curiously, some individuals with mirrored self-misidentification
can still recognize other people’s reflections (e.g., [14]). This
suggests that different neural processes may underlie the
recognition of self and others in a mirror. It is exceedingly difficult
to create a situation where mirror images of self and another
person are equivalent in size, luminance, orientation, and location
in space. We therefore asked participants to wear a facemask on
some trials (see Figure 1). This allowed them to see two distinct
facial features in a mirror under uniform conditions. We found no
differences between reflections of self when unmasked or masked
in the amplitudes or latencies of the P100, nor interactions with
cerebral hemisphere for any ERP component. However, masked
self produced larger amplitudes than unmasked self for both the
N170 and P250. This suggests that when seen in a mirror, self and
other faces result in similar featural encoding, but differences in
configural analysis and matching. Though this is the first
comparison of mirror images, similar differences in the N170
and P250 have been reported in ERP studies that compared
photographs of self with photographs of unfamiliar faces (e.g.,
[31,42]). It remains to be seen whether such differences also
emerge when comparing self and familiar others in a mirror, as
studies based upon photographs suggest these faces may differ in
relation to the matching stage only (e.g., [31,42], but see [43]).
This is the first study to examine neural responses to mirrors.
The fact that we found distinct neural signatures of self-recognition
in mirrors and photographs demonstrates that we cannot simply
generalize findings from one medium to the other. Our paradigm
raises the prospect of promising new avenues of inquiry that can
shed light on vexing questions about how we recognize ourselves.
Do ERPs change when young children first begin to recognize
themselves in mirrors and again when they later come to recognize
themselves in photographs and videos? How do ERPs in healthy
people compare to those with conditions in which the capacity for
self-recognition is distorted (e.g., anorexia) or impaired (e.g.,
mirrored self-misidentification)? To what extent are expectations
about one’s own appearance contributing to such conditions? Will
humans and great apes share similar neural patterns for self-
recognition using mirrors? The pursuit of such questions may go
some way to unraveling the mysteries that have been raised by our
obsession with that mirror on the wall.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Ethical clearance was granted from the University of Queens-
land’s Ethics Committee (approval number: 08-PSYCH-PhD-42-
CVH), which is in accordance with the regulations stipulated by
the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council.
Each participant gave informed written consent.
Participants
Thirty-three people participated (13 males, 20 females), ranging
from 24–39 years (M=28.70 years, SD=4.52). All were of
Caucasian descent, had normal to corrected vision, and were right
handed as determined by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
[44]. Participation was rewarded with either course credit or
payment (AUS$10.00 per hour).
Stimuli and Materials
Stimuli consisted of faces that were presented either as a (1)
mirrored reflection or (2) photograph. Participants viewed their
mirrored reflection while either wearing a mask or no mask. The
mask covered the entire face and was professionally coloured by a
beauty therapist. Eye slits allowed participants to see out with
minimal impairment. Photographs consisted of images of the
participant and the mask (worn by the experimenter). Additional
images were included to make the task more challenging and
ensure participants were maintaining their attention. These were
photographs of familiar (i.e. Justin Timberlake and Angelina Jolie)
and unfamiliar faces. The inter-trial stimulus consisted of a grey
and white checkerboard, the size of which matched the dimensions
of the mirror.
Photographs of self were uniformly modified using Corell Paint
Shop Pro (Corell Corporation, 2003) to be as similar as possible to
the participant’s reflection under experimental conditions (which
was determined during pilot testing). This process involved self-
photographs being: (1) mirror-reversed; (2) cropped at the chin,
ears, and hairline (this was primarily determined by the outline of
the head cover worn by the participant to cover up the electrodes);
(3) adjusted in hue, luminance, and lighting (i.e., a lighting effect
was used which gives the impression of lights shining down on the
participant’s face from above, as this occurred in the actual mirror
conditions); (4) mounted onto a black background; (5) resized using
a scale based upon the width of 250 pixels (this size was chosen
because it equated with the visual angle of seeing one’s reflection
when sitting c. 90 cm from the mirror; although all participant’s
faces were rescaled to this width, the original ratio was maintained
and this resulted in small differences in height between
individuals); (6) converted into BMP format.
Located directly on top of the 30640 cm screen of an NEC
AccuSync computer monitor was a 17.5612.5 cm double-sided
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall
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the same region where the photographs and inter-trial stimulus
were presented. On the top right and left hand corners of the
monitor were two Osram LED lights (wattage=0.23; http://
catalog.myosram.com). When these monitor lights were directed
at the participant’s face and the monitor screen behind the mirror
was black, this allowed the participant to clearly see their own face
in the mirror. When the monitor lights were turned off the mirror
became transparent, allowing the participant to see images as they
would normally be seen on the monitor screen.
The experimental task was designed and presented using E-
prime software (www.pstnet.com/eprime). All instructions and
images were displayed on a black background in the centre of the
aforementioned monitor, with a resolution of 10246768 pixels.
Participant responses were recorded using a standard numerical
keypad (arrow up=self; arrow right=familiar; arrow left=unfa-
miliar; and arrow down=mask). Response output was recorded by
E-prime (for accuracy and reaction times) and Bio Semi (for EEG;
http://www.bio-semi.com/).
Experimental Task
There were six different types of block within the experiment,
each of which consisted of trials predominantly coming from one
of the six experimental conditions: self in photograph, familiar in
photograph, unfamiliar in photograph, mask in photograph, self in
mirror, and mask in mirror. A run occurred when each of these six
blocks were presented without repeat. In total there were four runs
(i.e., 24 blocks), the order of which was counterbalanced between
participants (Table S1).
Each block consisted of pseudo-random trials numbering either
35 (for photographs) or 40 (for mirror images; this difference in
trial number was due to the need for removing those mirror trials
immediately following oddballs in the mirror blocks as these were
likely to involve adjustments in eye accommodation-see below).
Each face was shown for a maximum of 2000 ms, followed by the
1500 ms inter-trial stimulus. A response prior to 2000 ms would
immediately result in the re-appearance of the inter-trial stimulus
before going onto the next face. The total number of trials for each
condition (excluding oddballs and accommodation trials) was 121
for photographs and 126 for mirror images.
For each block the participant would be predominantly
presented with trials comprising of one particular face within a
particular medium (e.g., self repeatedly seen in the mirror).
Interspersed throughout these trials were also instances in which a
non-predominant (i.e., oddball) face was presented (e.g., the
unfamiliar photograph was seen in the predominantly self-mirror
block; note that self and mask images were only ever presented in
one medium within any given block, e.g., no trials of self in
photograph were placed within a self in mirror block). We
informed participants which face was going to be predominant at
the start of every block given that turning the lights on already
signalled that they would be most likely seeing mirrored
reflections. However, we varied the number of oddballs that
could be seen in any given block (between 1 and 9) to ensure that
participants would actually attempt to identify the images rather
than just blindly pressing the same button.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a two-hour session in a
dark room whilst sitting in a comfortable armchair. After
application of the electrode cap, participants were fitted with a
black cape, scarf, and head cover to ensure that only their face or
the mask could be seen in the mirror. Participants were instructed
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to the identity of
the face they saw as either self, mask, familiar or unfamiliar. At
the beginning of each block participants were presented with
information on the monitor indicating (1) which face would be
most likely seen on the monitor or mirror during that block, (2)
which buttons needed to be pressed for each face, and (3) which
hand they had to use for their responses. Before the experiment
started participants engaged in a practice session involving
shortened blocks (i.e., 21 trials) for all conditions. During this
practice, the experimenter asked participants to ensure that the
mirror images were as similar as possible to the photographs in
terms of size and luminance. This was accomplished by
manipulating either the monitor lights and/or the participant’s
distance from the monitor. Following the experiment, most
participants (starting from participant 10) were asked to indicate
the degree of similarity between photographs and mirror images
in terms of size and luminance (these ratings were: 5=0–5%
variance, 4=10–15% variance, 3=20–30% variance, 2=30–
40% variance, 1=.40% variance; reported size rating:
M=4.09, SE=.09; reported luminance rating: M=3.96,
SE=.08).
Electrophysiological Recording and Analyses
Event Related Potentials measure brain activity in the form of
electrical amplitude as a function of time. Because millisecond
resolution is attained, they afford the best opportunity to address
the various stages involved in face recognition [14,39,45].
Electroencephalogram (EEG) data was continuously obtained
using the Bio Semi Active Two system (http://www.bio-semi.
com/) and analysed offline using BESA software (http://www.
besa.de/index_home.htm). EEG was recorded using 64 Ag-AgCl
electrodes fixed within an electrode cap according to the widening
International 10–20 system [46] (Fp1, Fpz, Fp2, AF3, AF4, F7, F5,
F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, F6, F8, FT7, FC5, FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4,
FC6, FT8, T7, C5, C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, C6, T8, M1, TP7, CP5,
CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, CP6, TP8, M2, P7, P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2,
P4, P6, P8, PO7, PO5, PO3, POz, PO4, PO6, PO8, CB1, O1,
Oz, O2, CB2). The use of the Bio Semi Ag-AgCl active system
reduces the need for skin preparation, and keeps impedance below
1V (see http://www.bio-semi.com/). To track eye movements we
only recorded the horizontal electro-oculogram (EOG) by placing
a pair of Ag-AgCl surface electrodes in a position where they could
be covered by the black head cap (i.e., c. 2.5 cms laterally from the
outer canthi of the left and right eyes). We did not record the
vertical EOG as the placement of surface electrodes above and
below an eye would be visible to the participant when looking at
their mirrored reflection.
EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 1024 Hz with a band
pass filter between 0.01–100 Hz. These signals were originally
referenced to the CMS and DRL electrodes during data
acquisition before being re-referenced offline to the average of
the 64 channels (Bio Semi has replaced the need for ground
channels with Common Mode Sense active channel, and Driven
Right Leg passive electrode). Data were then segmented into
1250 ms epochs, with the 250 ms prior to stimulus onset used for
the baseline correction. After blink artefact correction [47], EEG
data were manually searched for EOG artefacts. BESA’s artefact
tool was then used for rejecting trials exceeding 100 mV. Oddballs,
accommodation trials, and incorrect trials were excluded from
analyses. EEG waveforms were then sorted with respect to
condition and averaged to create ERPs for each participant. A
minimal acceptance rate of 67 trials per condition was adopted,
with most participants providing between 80 and 111 trials for
each condition. ERPs were filtered with a high-pass filter of 0.1 Hz
and a low-pass filter of 45 Hz (both with a slope of 12 dB/octave
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across all participants, were then calculated.
Selection of Epochs and Channels for ERPs
Inspection of the grand average waveforms and topographical
maps indicated the presence of the following sequence of
components over posterior regions: a positive-going peak (P100),
a negative-going peak (N170), and a second positive-going peak
(P250). Peak amplitude was calculated as the measure for a
component if the component was clearly defined relative to the
baseline. The following components were subsequently measured
as such: P100 (80–160 ms), N170 (140–270 ms), and P250 (200–
400 ms). Channels were selected for each component where the
peak amplitude was maximal. Over posterior regions, the channels
used for each component were as follows: P100 (left hemisphere:
P7, P9, PO7, O1; centre: Oz; right hemisphere: P8, P10, PO8,
O2); N170 and P250 (left hemisphere: P7, P9, PO7; right
hemisphere: P8, P10, PO8). We note that these epochs, channels,
and regions are comparable to ones reported in prior self-
recognition studies [43,48,49,50,51].
Statistical Analyses
Accuracy rates for each condition were calculated as the
percentage of correct responses relative to the total amount of
correct and incorrect responses. Reaction times were also
calculated as the amount of time (in milliseconds) between the
presentation of the face and the participant’s response to it. ERP
data involved the amplitude and/or latency for each of the three
main components discussed above: P100, N170, and P250.
Because our primary concern was to address the possible effects
of medium in self-recognition we first compared self in mirror and
photographs. We predicted that self-recognition in photographs
and mirrors would result in distinct ERPs for each component of
face recognition. To test whether seeing one’s own face in a mirror
may be unique we then compared self in masked and unmasked
mirror conditions. We predicted that differences between self
when masked and unmasked would occur for the N170 and P250,
but not the P100.
All analyses were performed using repeated measures ANOVA
in SPSS (Version 17.0). Data were checked for normality using the
Shapiro-Wilk test. When necessary, significant p values were
adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser method for violations of
sphericity, while the Bonferroni method was used for follow-up
comparisons.
Accuracy and Reaction Times
Participants were no more accurate when responding to self in
photographs (M=99.21%, SE=.23) than the mirror (M=98.03%,
SE=.79; F(1, 32)=2.238, p.=.144; g
2=.065). Furthermore, there
was no difference between self when unmasked or masked
(M=97.73%, SE=1.07; F(1, 32)=.060, p.=808; g
2=.002). No
difference was found in reaction times between self in photographs
(M=481.61 ms, SE=10.78) and the mirror (M=471.16 ms,
SE=12.45; F(1, 32)=2.352, p.=.135; g
2=.068), nor between self
when unmasked or masked (M=481.41 ms, SE=11.98; F(1, 32)
=2.325, p.=.137; g
2=.068).
ERPs
P100: For medium, we found that photographs of self
(M=5.75 mV, SE=.38) produced a larger P100 compared to
reflections of self (M=3.72 mV, SE=.27; F(1, 32)=68.233,
p.=.000; g
2=.681). A main effect for hemisphere (left: 3.29 mV,
SE=.26; right: M=4.00 mV, SE=.31; F(1.671, 53.473)=71.802,
p.=.000; g
2=.692) was qualified by an interaction between
medium and hemisphere (F(2, 64)=6.910, p.=.002; g
2=.178).
Only when comparing photographs did the left hemisphere
(M=4.40 mV, SE=.35) show more amplitude than the right
hemisphere (M=5.28 mV, SE=.38, t(32)=22.879, p.=.007; self
mirror left: M=2.19 mV, SE=.23; self mirror right: M=2.73 mV,
SE=.31; t(32)=21.83, p.=.08).
For face identity we found no differences between reflections of
self when unmasked or masked (M=3.77 mV, SE=.30; F(1,
32)=.132, p.=.718; g
2=.004). There was more amplitude in the
right (M=2.77, SE=.28) than left hemisphere (M=2.23, SE=.26;
t(32)=22.046, p.=.049; F(2, 64)=79.941, p.=.000; g
2=.714).
No interaction was found between face identity and hemisphere
(self unmasked right: M=2.73, SE=.31; self unmasked left:
M=2.19, SE=.23; self masked right: M=2.82, SE=.28; self
masked left: M=2.27, SE=.30; F(1.644)=.293, p.=.704,
g
2=.009).
Severe violation of normality assumptions (Shapiro-Wilk ,p.
=.05) involving both mirror conditions lead to the removal of four
outliers (remaining N=28). Measuring latency at the channel where
peak amplitude was highest (Oz), we found photographs of self
(M=117. 74 ms, SE=3.09) resulted in a significantly later P100
compared to reflections of self (M=101.15 ms, SE=1.78; F(1,
27)=25.978, p.,.000; g
2=.490). For face identity there was no
difference between self when unmasked or masked (M=102.61 ms,
SE=1.70; F(1, 27)=1.571, p.=.221; g
2=.055).
N170: Violations of normality resulted in using data with two
outliers being excluded (remaining N=30). There was a larger
negativeamplitude for photographs of self(M=24.41 mV,SE=.37)
compared to reflections of self (M=22.25 mV, SE=.33; (F(1,
29)=68.705, p.=.000; g
2=.703). The right hemisphere (M=
23.79 mV, SE=.40) had more negative amplitude than the left
hemisphere (M=22.87 mV, SE=.35; F(1, 29)=6.232, p.=.018;
g
2=.177). No interaction was observed between medium and
hemisphere (self photograph left: M=23.82 mV, SE=.42; self
photograph right: M=24.99 mV, SE=.48; self mirror left:
M=21.92 mV, SE=.35; self mirror right: M=22.59 mV,
SE=.38;F(1, 29)=1.760, p.=.195; g
2=.057).
There was a larger negative amplitude for self masked
(M=23.46, SE=.30) than self unmasked (F(1, 29)=46.247,
p.=.000, g
2=.615). There was a non-significantdifference between
left (M=22.51, SE=.33) and right hemispheres (M=23.20,
SE=.37; F(1, 29)=3.948, p.=.056; g
2=.120). No interaction was
found between face identity and hemisphere (self unmasked left:
M=21.92, SE=.35; self unmasked right: M=22.59, SE=.38; self
masked left: M=23.10, SE=.34; self masked right: M=23.82,
SE=.40; F(1, 29)=.023, p.=.880; g
2=.001).
The N170 occurred earlier for photographs of self (M=
192.42 ms, SE=4.25) than reflections of self (M=230.45ms,
SE=3.66; (F (1, 32)=70.761, p.=.000;g
2=.689). For face identity,
the N170 for masked self (M=222.16ms, SE=4.06) occurred
earlier than for unmasked self (F(1, 32)=4.908, p.=.034;g
2=.133).
P250: For medium, no difference in P250 amplitude was found
between photographs of self (M=1.37 mV, SE=.24) and reflec-
tions of self (M=1.49 mV, SE=.21; F(1, 32)=.246, p.=.623;
g
2=.008). No difference was found between the hemispheres (left:
M=1.48 mV, SE=.20; right: M=1.38 mV, SE=.22; (F(1,
32)=.365, p.=.550; g
2=.011). An interaction between medium
and hemisphere (F(1, 32)=10.743, p.=.003; g
2=.251) revealed
no difference between left (M=1.26, SE=.23) and right
hemispheres (M=1.71, SE=.23) for reflections of self (t(32)=
22.317, p.=.027), whilst for photographs of self there was more
amplitude in the left (M=1.70, SE=.25) compared to right
hemisphere (M=1.05, SE=.30; t(32)=2.366, p.=.024).
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more amplitude than self unmasked (F(1, 32)=9.558, p.=.004;
g
2=.230). The right hemisphere (M=2.14, SE=.23) produced
more amplitude than the left hemisphere (M=1.65, SE=.19; F(1,
32)=13.284, p.=.001; g
2=.293). No interaction was observed
between face identity and hemisphere (self unmasked left:
M=1.26 mV, SE=.23; self unmasked right: M=1.71 mV,
SE=.23; self masked left: M=2.04 mV, SE=.27; self masked
right: M=2.57 mV, SE=.31; F(1, 32)=.057, p.=.813;g
2=.002).
We observed no difference in P250 latency for photographs of
self (M=283.75 ms, SE=7.95) compared to reflections of self
(M=290.16 ms, SE=9.66; F(1, 32)=.392, p.=.536; g
2=0.12).
For face identity, there was no difference in latency between self
when unmasked or masked (M=308.02 ms; SE=8.30; F(1,
32)=3.241, p.=.081; g
2=.092).
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Diagram of experimental setup.
(TIFF)
Table S1 Outline of trials in each experimental condi-
tion/block.
(DOC)
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